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Note
Reclassifying Geostationary Earth Orbit as
Private Property: Why Natural Law and
Utilitarian Theories of Property Demand
Privatization
Ian Blodger*
The impending catastrophic destruction of satellite
communications necessitates an immediate reexamination of
the underlying assumptions made about private property in
outer space.1 Recent advances in technology have reduced
barriers to space exploration and utilization, leading to
increased investment in space in the form of satellites.2 This
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1. See Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National
Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement To Clean Up the
Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 589, 598 (2011) (Experts warn that if the
cascade effect occurs, space will be unusable for centuries due to the time it
will take for all of the debris to eventually disintegrate in Earths atmosphere.
If space debris is not immediately countered by preventative and removal
measures, the cascade effect could occur in little more than a decade.);
Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and
the International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095,
1124 (2000) (Satellite developers forego costs when they can design and
operate spacecraft that take advantage of the communal environment. Losses
due to pollution are borne by society as a whole, while the cost savings accrue
solely to the developer. In this instance, the costs to the community
environment manifest themselves in the form of orbiting debris.).
2. See Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The
Inhibition of Private Industry in Outer Space, 15 WIS. INTL L.J. 421, 421
(1997) (describing the rapid increase in the number of man-made satellites
since the 1957 launch of Sputnik); April Greene Apking, Comment, The Rush
To Develop Space: The Role of Spacefaring Nations in Forging Environmental
Standards for the Use of Celestial Bodies for Governmental and Private
Interests, 16 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POLY 429, 430 (2005) (The time has
come when the concept of going straight up for the average person is much
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increased investment has brought about numerous scientific
discoveries,3 military applications,4 and may one day lead to a
dispersal of the population across the solar system.5 This
increased saturation of Earths orbits has created a problem
with debris that threatens to grow until it cuts off access to
space.6 To further complicate the issue, some corporations are
reluctant to commit large quantities of resources to space
because of the current disposition of international law,7 even
more of a reality as both the public and private sectors push to develop the
necessary technology to explore space.).
3. See, e.g., Nola Taylor Redd, 6 Biggest Space Science Discoveries of
2013, SPACE.COM (Dec. 28, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.space.com/24099-
biggest-space-science-discoveries-2013.html (describing six scientific
discoveries made through investments in space during the year 2013).
4. See, e.g., Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military
Foundation of U.S. Hegemony, INTL SECURITY, Summer 2003, at 5, 12
(Though the United States is not yet committed to actual combat in or from
space, it spends vast amounts on reconnaissance, navigation, and
communication satellites. These satellites provide a standing infrastructure to
conduct military operations around the globe.).
5. Ross Andersen, Exodus: Musk Argues that we Must put a Million
People on Mars if we Are to Ensure that Humanity has a Future, AEON (Sept.
30, 2014), http://aeon.co/magazine/technology/the-elon-musk-interview-on-
mars.
6. See Imburgia, supra note 1, at 59799 (identifying scholarly support
that the effects of the cascade effect will only worsen in coming years).
7. See RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF
MINERALS IN OUTER SPACE 96 (Ram S. Jakhu ed., 2012) ([I]mportant
fundamental terms of the [space] treaties were left vague and ambiguous . . . .
Not surprisingly, however, private and commercial interests often require
relative legal certainty over their rights and liabilities before being able to
obtain largescale investments that commercial activity requires.); Benjamin
David Landry, A Tragedy of the Anticommons: The Economic Inefficiencies of
Space Law, 38 BROOK. J. INTL L. 523, 528 (2013) (noting that currently each
state has an equal right to the benefits derived from outer space while
national sovereignty is prohibited). But see Ashlee Vance, Revealed: Elon
Musks Plan to Build a Space Internet, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 16, 2015, 7:50
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-17/elon-musk-and-
spacex-plan-a-space-internet (describing Elon Musks plan to place hundreds
of satellites into space for internet purposes). Vance notes that Musks
satellites will likely be positioned in low earth orbit. This accounts for his
willingness to invest more than those interested in GEO satellites, which
must be built for long-term use and accordingly cost more. See generally Rolfe
Winkler & Andy Pasztor, Elon Musks Next Mission: Internet Satellites, WALL
STREET J. ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-
musks-next-mission-internet-satellites-1415390062 (Musk and Wyler have
discussed launching around 700 satellites, each weighing less than 250
pounds . . . . That is about half the size of the smallest communications
satellites now in commercial use.).
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with the economic benefits gained from utilizing outer space as
a resource.8 Rather than allowing for the private appropriation
of space, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer
Space Treaty, which governs actions taken in space, essentially
requires that all property remain communal.9 The communal
approach to this area of space has affected the method of
distributing geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) zones.10 The
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an agency
created during the 1860s to help facilitate telegraph
communications, now works to help companies find orbital
zones and frequencies that are not currently in use by other
GEO satellites, but the ITU does not confer upon such
companies a property right in either the frequencies or orbital
zones.11 The current method of GEO allocation has created a
number of problems including the increasing number of non-
operational satellites, and debris resulting from satellite
collisions.12 The current orbital zone surrounding Earth
8. See, e.g., Julie A. Jiru, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint
Chips Off a Treatys Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 155, 157 (2000)
(describing some of the numerous benefits available to entities utilizing the
moon and space generally).
9. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (The
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be
the province of all mankind.). But see LEE, supra note 7, at 16669
(discussing how, in contrast to its prohibition on claims of sovereignty
regarding celestial bodies, the treaty likely does not foreclose the possibility of
either private or governmental appropriation of property in space).
10. See generally Roberts, supra note 1, at 1111 (It is important to note
that the ITU process does not, strictly speaking, allocate the frequencies or
orbital positions that it registers.).
11. Id. at 1106, 1111.
12. Id. at 1124. But cf. Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions, NASA
ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFF, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#14
(last updated Mar. 2012) (Our ability to detect orbital debris [in GEO] is
limited, but studies indicate that the orbital debris population is probably less
severe there than in low Earth orbit. However, since the geostationary orbit is
a special natural resource, many spacecraft operators boost their old
spacecraft into higher, disposal orbits at the end of their mission.).
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contains over 20,000 pieces of debris.13 While much of this
debris remains in low Earth orbit (LEO), the unique utility of
the geostationary orbit has resulted in high concentrations of
debris being located [in geostationary orbit].14 Orbital debris
poses a severe threat to U.S. national security, and will present
problems to future space operations.15 While different
programs have been offered to solve the orbital debris problem,
none of these solutions focuses on whether GEO should be
considered private or public property.16 In order to choose an
effective and just solution to the problems facing GEO, it is
important to understand whether GEO exhibits the same kinds
of qualities found in areas capable of private ownership or
13. STEVEN A. HILDRETH & ALLISON ARNOLD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43353, THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN SPACE: ORBITAL
DEBRIS MITIGATION AND REMOVAL 2 (2014) (Today, the Space Surveillance
Network tracks more than 23,000 objects 10 cm in diameter or larger in orbit
around the Earth. Of those, only about 1,100 (5%) are active satellites. The
rest is orbital debris.). See generally Karl Tate, Space Junk Explained: How
Orbital Debris Threatens Future of Spaceflight, SPACE.COM (Oct. 1, 2013,
5:49 PM), http://www.space.com/23039-space-junk-explained-orbital-debris-
infographic.html (A 4-inch-wide (10 cm) particle impacting a spacecraft would
likely result in a catastrophic disintegration.).
14. Roberts, supra note 1, at 1125.
15. See Theresa Hitchens, Space Debris, GLOBAL NETWORK AGAINST
WEAPONS & NUCLEAR POWER IN SPACE (Aug. 2005),
http://www.space4peace.org/articles/debris_facts.htm (The amount of space
junk is increasing by about 5 percent per year; meaning that by the end of the
century a satellite in GEO will have a 40 percent chance of being struck
during its operational life-time.); William J. Lynn, III, A Military Strategy for
the New Space Environment, WASH. Q., Summer 2011, at 7 (Space systems
enable our modern way of war. They allow our warfighters to strike with
precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to
see the battlefield with clarity. Without them, many of our most important
military advantages evaporate.).
16. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 1, at 1135 (Permitting available orbital
positions and frequencies to be auctioned instead of simply coordinated among
competing applicants enhances the procedural efficiency of the process,
eliminates the substantive market subsidy, reduces the likelihood of conflict
within the international community, and allows for the allocation of the
benefits of geostationary communications on a more equitable basis.);
Gabrielle Hollingsworth, Comment, Space Junk: Why the United Nations Must
Step in to Save Access to Space, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 239, 264 (2013) (The
best option for UN COPUOS, then, is to develop a stronger, clearer, more
uniform binding regime to deal with space debris specifically.); Mark J.
Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share
Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 125, 138 (2000)
(Market-share liability provides the only fair and effective solution to the
unidentified debris problem.).
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whether GEO exhibits the kinds of qualities found in areas
foreclosed to privatization.17
This Note seeks to determine whether the current,
communal, approach to property rights in GEO accurately
reflects the principles underlying the division between public
and private goods. The current law of property in space has not
only limited investment, but has also led to an apathetic
approach to the communal area, necessitating a
reconsideration of the presumptions underlying the initial
classification of space as communal. Section I of this Note will
first examine the current problem facing GEO, and describe the
international approach to property rights in space. Second, this
Note will detail two natural law approaches to property
acquisition, and examine Harold Demsetzs utilitarian
approach to the creation of property rights. Section II of this
Note will first analyze whether satellite operators meet the
criteria distilled by the natural law theorists as being sufficient
for the creation of a property right. Then, this Note will
determine if a property interest is warranted under a
utilitarian approach to property. This Note will conclude that,
due to the inherently scarce and labor-intensive nature of GEO
as well as the numerous economic benefits derived from
privatization, the orbital zone should be privatized.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE NATURE OF GEOSTATIONARY EARTH ORBIT
GEO is an orbital zone above Earths equator where the
satellite remains above the same point on Earth.18 GEO is
17. FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, The Law, in THE LAW, THE STATE, AND OTHER
POLITICAL WRITINGS, 18431850, at 107, 108 (Jacques de Guenin ed., Jane &
Michel Willems trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2012) (1850) (Each of us certainly
holds from nature and God the right to defend our person, our freedom, and
our property . . . . [S]ince force on the individual level cannot legitimately be
aimed at the person, freedom, or property of another individual, by the same
argument force cannot legitimately be used collectively to destroy the person,
freedom, or property of either individuals or classes.). It follows that if the
state is to act to protect or eliminate a property right, we must first determine
whether there exists a right at all, lest the government take an unjust action.
18. Planetary Orbits, NASA JET PROPULSION LABORATORY,
http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/basics/bsf5-1.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (To
achieve a geostationary orbit, a geosynchronous orbit is chosen with an
eccentricity of zero, and an inclination of either zero, right on the equator, or
else low enough that the spacecraft can use propulsive means to constrain the
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important for satellite communication because it allows
permanent installations on Earth to point directly to the
satellite, receiving information without constant re-
calibration.19 The number of satellites that can use a GEO at a
time is limited to roughly 2000 satellites because of the
potential for communication frequency interference.20
Currently, the approximate number of active satellites
occupying a geostationary orbit is 412.21 GEO differs from LEO
in that LEO objects are closer to Earths surface and do not
remain fixed over a specific location.22 The different movement
of these satellites is due to the increased speed at which they
must travel so that they do not fall to the surface.23 While GEO
satellites are typically used for communications, LEO satellites
are often used for experimentation because of the relative ease
spacecrafts apparent position so it hangs seemingly motionless above a point
on Earth.).
19. Michael J. Finch, Comment, Limited Space: Allocating the
Geostationary Orbit, 7 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 788, 788 (1986) (The importance
of the geostationary orbit becomes apparent when one considers that most
telecommunications, broadcasting, and weather satellites must be in an orbit
over a specific point of the earth, usually over a receiving station.); Satellite
Orbits, EMEA SATELLITE OPERATORS ASSN, http://www.esoa.net/Orbits.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (The geostationary orbit is useful for
communications applications because ground based antennas, which must be
directed toward the satellite, can operate effectively without the need for
expensive equipment to track the satellites motion.).
20. Finch, supra note 19, at 789 (The reason for this limitation is that,
while occupying a slot in space, a satellite requires a specific radio frequency
in the electromagnetic spectrum. These radio frequencies must be different
and the satellites must be approximately eighteen kilometers apart so that
there is no interference between the different transmissions. Theoretically, the
total number of satellites capable of remaining in geostationary orbit is
approximately 2000.).
21. List of Satellites in Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE SIGNALS (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.satsig.net/sslist.htm.
22. Mak King & Michael J. Riccio, Military Satellite Communications:
Then and Now, CROSSLINK, Spring 2010, at 40, 44, http://www.aerospace.org
/wp-content/uploads/crosslink/V11N1.pdf (When a satellite orbits at less than
GEO altitude, its orbital period is less than Earths period of rotation, so it
moves across the sky. The lower the altitude, the faster the satellite moves.).
23. DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY 20 (2005)
(Since the gravitational pull grows weaker the further a satellite is from
Earth, the centrifugal force needed to balance gravity also decreases with
distance from the Earth. The higher the satellites orbit, the lower its orbital
speed.).
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with which they may be accessed.24 However, because of these
satellites proximity to the Earths surface, their orbits decay
more quickly than those of GEO satellites,25 which remain in
orbit essentially forever.26 The chance that non-operational
satellites or other debris will remain in geostationary orbit
forever is problematic for future investors hoping to use the
limited spaces remaining for their own satellites.27
B. THE PROBLEMS FACING SATELLITES IN GEO
With the investment of satellites in space comes an
increase in debris.28 Debris is largely made up of inactive
payloads, rocket bodies, and fragmented satellite components
24. Types of Orbits, IOWA ST. UNIV.: POLARIS PROJECT,
http://www.polaris.iastate.edu/EveningStar/Unit4/unit4_sub3.htm (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015) (Low Earth Orbit is used for things that we want to visit often
with the Space Shuttle, like the Hubble Space Telescope and the International
Space Station . . . . It is also about the only way we can have people go up, do
experiments, and return in a relatively short time.).
25. Id. (Even though the amount of atmosphere is far too little to breath
[sic], there is enough to place a small amount of drag on the satellite or other
object. As a result, over time these objects slow down and their orbits slowly
decay.).
26. Manpreet Kaur Thind & C. Lokesh, Removal of Space Debris Using
Laser, 3 ADVANCES AEROSPACE SCI. & APPLICATIONS 107, 108 (2013)
(Satellites in GEO drift along after the end of their service life coming to the
so called potential holes where satellites may remain forever.); Orbital Debris
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12 (The higher the altitude, the
longer the orbital debris will typically remain in Earth orbit. Debris left in
orbits below 600 km normally fall back to Earth within several years. At
altitudes of 800 km, the time for orbital decay is often measured in decades.
Above 1,000 km, orbital debris will normally continue circling the Earth for a
century or more.).
27. W. Flury et al., Searching for Small Debris in the Geostationary Ring,
EUR. SPACE AGENCY BULL., Nov. 2000, at 92, 99,
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet104/flury104.pdf (The population of
anthropogenic objects in the geostationary ring is steadily increasing. There is
no natural cleaning mechanism, such as air-drag, which removes objects from
the ring . . . . About 250270 satellites in GEO are controlled, but more than
100 have been left there at their end-of-life rather than being transferred to a
disposal orbit. The latter constitute a hazard for operational spacecraft in
GEO and are therefore a burden for the future.).
28. Meghan R. Plantz, Note, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GA. J. INTL
& COMP. L. 585, 592 (2012) (As the demand for and use of orbital space
increases, due in part to advancing technology that requires satellite
operations, the potential for orbital debris likewise increases. The increasing
accumulation of orbital debris directly correlates with the increasing risk of a
debris collision with spacecraft.).
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created by accidental collisions.29 Debris orbiting Earth mostly
occupies the LEO zone, however, GEOs special attributes
mean that large clusters of debris have accumulated there as
well.30 The current mass of debris is problematic because it
creates a risk of damaging satellites in orbit,31 and, as a result,
requires satellite operators to undertake expensive protection
measures like incorporating satellite shielding and
maneuvering capabilities.32 Additionally, this increasing risk to
satellites reduces the incentive to invest in GEO positions
because the lifespan of the satellite is key to its profitability.33
Ultimately, action must be taken soon to curb the threat to
current and future satellites because debris will continue to
collide with satellites, producing more debris in a cascade
effect, which could, in turn, prevent access to certain orbits.34
C. THE CURRENT STATE OF SPACE LAW
The ambiguity inherent in the current approach to space
law reflects the desire to quickly reduce tensions between the
United States and Russia during the Cold War.35 These two
29. Id.
30. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1125 ([T]he unique utility of the
geostationary orbit has resulted in high concentrations of debris being located
there.).
31. See, e.g., Imburgia, supra note 1, at 596 (Unfortunately, the space
debris problem is not limited to near misses. On February 10, 2009, five
hundred miles above Siberia, a Russian communications satellite collided with
a privately owned Iridium telecommunications satellite in an unprecedented
orbital accident that would have been visible from the Earth.).
32. See Jared B. Taylor, Note, Tragedy of the Space Commons: A Market
Mechanism Solution to the Space Debris Problem, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L.
253, 262 (2011) (In response to these risks, satellite and spacecraft
manufacturers implement several defensive mechanisms to reduce the
probability of losing spacecraft to space debris: debris shielding, evasive
maneuvering and debris monitoring. Each of these defense mechanisms,
however, entails an entirely new set of costs.).
33. See Eur. Space Agency [ESA], Position Paper on Space Debris
Mitigation: Implementing Zero Debris Creation Zones, at 16, ESA SP-1301
(Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1301/sp1301.pdf (Net Present
Value (NPV) and Return on Investment (ROI) are both seen to decline
dramatically as the effective lifetime of a communication satellite is reduced
in order to move to a disposal orbit.).
34. See generally Imburgia, supra note 1, at 598 (If space debris is not
immediately countered by preventative and removal measures, the cascade
effect could occur in little more than a decade.).
35. See Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights,
and International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real
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countries, along with others, signed the Outer Space Treaty in
1967.36 The Outer Space Treaty prevents countries from using
space for military purposes, and requires that all uses of space
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind.37 The
statement that space shall be the province of mankind is
mirrored in another provision of the treaty, which states,
[o]uter space . . . is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.38 This treaty provision is subject to differing
interpretations;39 however, when the treaty is applied to GEO,
most governments and international agencies have acted as
though the provision precludes private ownership.40
Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 59, 41 (2008) (In fact, the
framers of the Outer Space Treaty were deliberately ambiguous about private
property, as opposed to nationally owned property, to allow ratification of the
Treaty by both the U.S., which wanted to encourage private enterprise in
space, and the U.S.S.R., which did not . . . . The treaty was negotiated by the
United States and the Soviet Union in order to end the costly space race
between them.); cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9 (reflecting Cold War-era
fears of space warfare and highlighting several times the desire for space
exploration to be for peaceful purposes).
36. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9; Bryon C. Brittingham, Does the
World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INTL L. 31, 34 (2010) (The
first and most important of these treaties is . . . the Outer Space Treaty. It was
drafted by the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
(COPUOS). This treaty has been ratified by 100 nations, including all of the
nations involved in space, so it is widely accepted as the international law
governing outer space activities.).
37. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. I.
38. Id. at art. II.
39. See Landry, supra note 7, at 533 (There has been debate over
whether this anti-appropriation language applies to public and private
entities, with scholars coming to conflicting conclusions. So even if private
entities are able to retain most of their profits through interpretation of
Article I, it is uncertain whether they can take property without staking a
sovereign claim to it.); Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 142 (2009) (Interpreting
Article II has engendered debates among academics and policymakers. Some
see it as giving private interests freedom of action in space, so long as a
government supervises but does not nationalize new territory. Others believe
this clause hinders economic development by voiding property rights and
making entrepreneurs less apt to invest.).
40. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.158 (2014) (providing licenses but not a
property right in geosynchronous orbit positions); Roberts, supra note 1, at
1111. But see Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, I.T.U.
Doc. WARC-BS 81-E (Dec. 3, 1976), http://www.jaxa.jp/library
/space_law/chapter_2/2-2-1-2_e.html [hereinafter Bogotá Declaration]
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Subsequent treaties have attempted to clarify provisions of the
current ambiguous space law concerning the privatization of
space, asserting that there cannot be private property in space,
but these efforts received little international support from
major spacefaring nations.41 As a result, the interpretive value
of these later treaties is dubious at best.42
In contrast to passively assuming GEO is not subject to
private or national appropriation, most countries actively
argued against national appropriation when eight equatorial
countries attempted to assert sovereign control over the orbital
zone.43 In response to what the equatorial nations perceived as
an inequitable distribution of GEO slots, these countries
declared that the GEO zones above their land were their
sovereign territory.44 These countries based their claim of
sovereignty on the theory that GEO is not a part of space since
the effect of GEO depends solely upon Earths gravitational
(declaring that a number of equatorial nations assert an ownership interest in
the GEO above their countries).
41. See, e.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S.
22 (notably absent major spacefaring nation signatories: United States,
China, Russia, India, any European Space Agency members). See generally
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
at § 3, art. 31 (describing how later treaties may be used to define the context
of an earlier treaty and assist in interpretation).
42. See MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN ET AL., THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR NEW SPACE LAWYERS 66 (2012) (None of the major space
powers are party to the Moon Agreement, so it is generally considered
dormant.).
43. See Finch, supra note 19, at 790 (Such a claim of sovereignty is
rejected by nations that have launched satellites into geostationary orbit and
developing nations which have not yet launched such satellites. A majority of
nations believe the geostationary orbit is a part of outer space and, as such, is
governed by the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.); Nima Nayebi,
The Geosynchronous Orbit and the Outer Limits of Westphalian Sovereignty, 3
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 471, 489 (2011) (In the end, the overwhelming
consensus at the Subcommittee was that claims of sovereignty over the GSO
[Geostationary Synchronous Orbit; synonymous with GEO] or any other part
of outer space are incompatible with the express and implied spirit of the
Outer Space Treaty and should be dismissed.).
44. Bogotá Declaration, supra note 40 (The solutions proposed by the
International Telecommunications Union . . . are at present impracticable and
unfair and would considerably increase the exploitation costs of this resource
especially for developing countries that do not have equal technological and
financial resources as compared to industrialized countries, who enjoy an
apparent monopoly in the exploitation and use of its geostationary
synchronous orbit.).
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field.45 Additionally, the Bogotá Declaration suggests that
these GEO zones are akin to natural resources because of their
scarcity.46 Under this theory, the Outer Space Treaty does not
govern GEO because GEO is considered a part of Earth.47
Critics have pointed out that all orbits around the earth rel[y]
exclusively on the gravity of Earth and, accordingly, this is no
justification for the singular treatment for the geostationary
orbit.48 While the means by which these eight countries
asserted their sovereign rights might be problematic, their
underlying premisethat the current method of GEO
distribution is inequitableremains true.49
D. COMPETING THEORIES ABOUT THE NATURE OF PROPERTY
1. Natural Law Theories of Property
In determining whether newly discovered property should
be private or communal, the two relevant theories rest on
natural law and economics of law.50 Natural law is based on the
fundamental principle that there is a readily discernable truth
that governs relationships among people.51 John Locke argues
that the inherent equality of man implies that nature is not
45. Id. ([G]eostationary synchronous orbit is a physical fact linked to the
reality of our planet because its existence depends exclusively on its relation
to gravitational phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must
not be considered part of the outer space.).
46. Id. (The geostationary orbit is a scarce natural resource, whose
importance and value increase rapidly together with the development of space
technology and with the growing need for communication.).
47. Id.
48. LEE, supra note 7, at 171.
49. Id. at 17677 (However, even though these claims have been widely
rejected, it demonstrates a deep sentiment among some States that the space
law framework under the Outer Space Treaty does not adequately protect the
interests of the developing States . . . .).
50. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1967, at 347, 350 (describing the economic theory); JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 4 (J. W. Hough ed., Basil
Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1966) (1690) (describing the natural law theory).
51. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 9 (The state of Nature has a law of Nature
to govern it . . . .). See also HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR
THE RIGHTWHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN
TRADE 7 (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1916) (1633) (describing how God has handed down certain laws
which govern the relationships among men).
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initially under the exclusive control of any one person.52 Rather
than suggesting that this leaves everything in communal
ownership, Locke argues that, in the state of nature, things are
simply not owned at the outset.53 However, once an individual
controls something such that he makes use of it, benefitting
from it, the property becomes his; this is the labor theory of
value.54 Locke expands on this, concluding with the suggestion
that an investment of labor will confer a property right over
that which is removed from the state of nature.55 Locke
identifies the initial input of labor as the bright-line at which a
property is conferred.56 These same principles apply to land as
they do to objects in the world.57 It should be noted that Lockes
theory of natural law, as outlined by Locke, is deontological in
nature, meaning that the conferral of a property right is not
determined by who can best utilize the space, but by the simple
test of which person first invested labor.58 This deontological
52. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 25 ([N]obody has originally a private
dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of [the Earths natural
resources] as they are thus in their natural state . . . .).
53. See John T. Sanders, Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 367, 375 (1987) (If Locke had really thought that
resources were communally owned before private acquisition, then he would
have been driven to the conclusion that everyones permission must be asked
before an individuals labor was mixed with such resources. Since this
conclusion plays no part in his theory, he can not have thought that resources
were communally owned in the first place.). But see Jeffrey M. Gaba, John
Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 536 (2007)
(Given these premises - a world of communal property to which each
individual had an equal claim - the justification of private property was
difficult. Locke solved this problem, in a way no predecessor had, through his
labor theory.).
54. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 25 (Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the
state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with
it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in,




57. Id. at 28 (But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of
the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which
takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in that
too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his
labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common.).
58. See id. at 3840 (describing how money creates a feedback mechanism
allowing actors to exchange goods they can no longer use for goods which have
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approach is based on considerations of justice that require a
recognition of a persons labor so long as that labor does not
unjustly deprive another of their pursuits.59
One issue with Lockes approach to property is
determining how much labor is enough to confer a right of
ownership.60 Some theories of Lockes definition of labor claim
that improvement of the object is a necessary condition for
ownership, though these readings often do not take into
account key passages of Lockes work that suggest otherwise.61
John Sanders article on the justness of Lockes theory outlines
the most consistent approach to the definition of labor in
Lockes theory of property acquisition, claiming that an
investment of labor indicates an intent to do something or
produce something that is important to the laborer, and that
considerations of justice preclude others from preventing a
pursuit of the laborers end.62 Under Sanders interpretation of
Lockes theory, not only must a laborer actually invest some
kind of effort into a thing, but they must do so with an intent of
more value to them; suggesting that the inefficiencies created by an
overinvestment of one person do not deprive him of his rights to the spoils of
his labor); Sanders, supra note 53, at 396 (The labor-mixing criterion derives
its force from the fact that the investment of labor almost always indicates an
intent to do something or produce something that is important to the laborer.
In general, justice requires that we respect such projects, at least where the
projects themselves do not involve injustice to others, whether intended or not.
To acknowledge that a person acquires property through mixing labor with
unowned resources is simply to acknowledge the injustice of interfering with
projects that other people deem important, or of robbing them of the fruits of
those projects.).
59. See Sanders, supra note 53.
60. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974)
(discussing the problem of limiting the labor theory and eventually asking,
[i]f I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its
molecules . . . mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the
sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?); Kojo Yelpaala, Owning
the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 111, 150 (2000) (Although Locke did not define labor, examples of
activities he considered labor suggest that he had set a very low threshold for
conduct that would constitute labor. For him, the simple act of picking up
acorns was sufficient labor to confer property rights over them.).
61. Compare Robert Thompson, Property Theory and Owning the Sandy
Shore: No Firm Ground to Stand on, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 55 (2006)
(Thus, Lockes labor theory essentially creates the elements for prior
appropriation: one finds land that is unoccupied (or at least inadequately
occupied), encloses it, and improves it with ones labor.), with LOCKE, supra
note 50, at 25.
62. Sanders, supra note 53, at 396.
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doing something important as opposed to simply converting the
thing into property.63
Lockes theory places one limitation on the initial
acquisition of property: a person may convert as much from the
state of nature to his own property as possible, at least where
there is enough, and as good left in common for others.64 Locke
derives this limitation from his foundation that the purpose of
private property is the public welfare, concluding that the
acquisition of private property should not be used in opposition
to this end.65 While Locke discusses this limitation on the
acquisition of property, he also concludes that the exchange of
goods will suffice to see the excess used such that its taking
will not violate the limitation.66 Essentially, Locke argues that
surplus creates the need for money, which will be used to
63. See id. The value of this additional component of the definition of
labor is dubious since all labor is undertaken in the pursuit of an end, whether
the end is personal or altruistic. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I,
ch. 1 (Albert Keith Whitaker ed., Joe Sachs trans., Focus Publishing 2002) (c.
350 B.C.E.) (discussing the different kinds of possible ends in relation to
others). Sanders uses this approach to distinguish between individuals who
take action for the sake of converting the state of nature into property, from
those who take action in order to create a benefit, which does make more
sense. Sanders, supra note 53, at 396.
64. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 25, 38 (For this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others . . . . He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or
apples had thereby a property in them; they were his goods as soon as
gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled, else he
took more than his share, and robbed others.) (emphasis added).
65. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 2425 (The earth and all that is therein
is given to men for the support and comfort of their being . . . . [Y]et being
given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate
them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to
any particular men.); Sanders, supra note 53, at 372 (It is a just way of
acquiring property, so long as one does not lose sight of the whole purpose of
private property: human welfare. Where private property comes into conflict
with human welfare, private property loses.). See also NOZICK, supra note 60,
at 178 (Whether or not Lockes particular theory of appropriation can be
spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate
theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of
the ones we have attributed to Locke.).
66. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 39 (And thus came in the use of money,
some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual
consent, men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable
supports of life.).
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ensure an efficient use of resources.67 Thus, so long as there is
the property interest created in GEO is freely alienable, it will
not fall into unnecessary disuse and the proviso is satisfied.68
While this specific restriction on Lockes theory may not
apply, other natural rights theorists have argued there are
restrictions on the initial acquisition of property in certain
contexts. Such a theory underlies the law of the sea, which, in
turn, serves as a foundation for the current space law regime.69
The law of the sea was initially recognized by Hugo Grotius on
natural law principles, which held, [e]very nation is free to
travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.70 Grotius
further argues that if the use of a thing implies the exclusion of
others uses, then that thing can be privately owned.71 Building
from these premises, Grotius argues that occupation and
exclusion are necessary conditions for the creation of property
rights.72 This explanation may suggest a difference between
67. See Gaba, supra note 53, at 539 (If property could be transformed
into a non-perishable and productive form, then the spoilage proviso would be
satisfied . . . . By creating systems of currency, humans could transform
property into a form that would never spoil but could still be put to productive
use in satisfying the wants of individuals.).
68. See id.
69. See Shackelford, supra note 39, at 141 (The governing treaties of
space law share many similarities with [United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea] and the [Antarctica Treaty System].).
70. GROTIUS, supra note 51; see Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and
Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U.
J. INTL L. & POL. 703, 707 (2001) (Grotius noted that use of the oceans for
fishing or for navigation by one did not preclude their use by others. The
oceans were created by nature in such a state that their usage could not be
exclusive but belonged to all humankind.).
71. Id. at 24 (For since there are some things, the use of which consists in
their being used up, either because having become part of the very substance
of the user they can never be used again, or because by use they become less
fit for future use, it has become apparent, especially in dealing with the first
category, such things as food and drink for example, that a certain kind of
ownership is inseparable from use.).
72. Id. at 27 (The first is, that that which cannot be occupied, or which
never has been occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all
property has arisen from occupation. The second is, that all that which has
been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still
suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in
perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by
nature.). See Brilmayer, supra note 70, at 707 ([T]hings that cannot be
seized or enclosed cannot become property.); Adam Mossoff, What Is
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 385 (2003)
(The ocean is incapable of being the subject of dominion because it is
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Lockes and Grotius basic theories of property, however the
fundamental underpinning of their theories is the same: the
right to exclude others is necessary for property rights.73
Lockes theory of labor closely matches Grotius theory because,
for Locke, labor itself implies exclusion of others.74 However,
there is a tension on this point because Grotius does not argue
that labor is enough to confer a property right, and his
conclusion essentially contradicts Lockes bright-line claim.75
Applying these fundamental principles to the law of the sea,
Grotius argues, all that which has been so constituted by
nature that although serving some one person it still suffices
for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in
perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first
created by nature.76 Grotius recognizes one exception to this
statement: that if a person does come to occupy something
generally used in common, then that person gains an exclusive
right to use that area for as long as the area remains
occupied.77 Grotius finds that all men hold the sea in common
because it typically cannot be enclosed, and its use by one
person does not foreclose its use to others.78 These qualities
incapable of being occupied, which means that it is incapable of an exclusive
possession that would give rise to a right to property. Without the ability to
exclude others physically, according to the first application of the modern
concept of property, there can be no right to property. The right to property is
analytically predicated upon the right to exclude.).
73. See Mossoff, supra note 72, at 386 (Although he parts company with
Grotius . . . in the details, Locke begins from the same theoretical starting
point.).
74. See id. at 389 (In this context, the mixing labor argument reflects
the premises of suum and dominion that explicitly take center stage in
Grotiuss and Pufendorfs arguments for property.). Compare id. at 389
(Locke is clear that labor begets the concept of property by extending ones
exclusive moral claim to ones life and liberty over material objects in the
world at large.), with GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 24 (For own implies that a
thing belongs to some one person, in such a way that it cannot belong to any
other person.).
75. See GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 30 (arguing that even if someone
invests labor into building something in the sea, that building is only
sufficient to confer a limited right to the area).
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 30 (If any part of these things is by nature susceptible of
occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so far
as such occupation does not affect its common use.).
78. Id. at 28 (For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is
so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is
adapted for the use of all . . . .).
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require the sea to be considered common property and not
privatized.79 This does not preclude the extension of a countrys
legal jurisdiction into the sea, but only precludes the state and
private individuals from exercising an ownership interest in
the sea.80
This limitation is expressed in the Outer Space Treaty.81
The non-appropriation principles of the treaty are based on the
theory that space, like the sea, is a potential medium of
transport, and that the occupation of one small part of the area
will not foreclose anothers use of the remaining portions of
space.82 The current GEO regulation regime also follows the
79. Id. at 34 (Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an
article of merchandise, and which cannot become private property.).
Jonathan Thomas notes that Grotius explicitly relates the sky and the sea,
concluding, [t]herefore, the skies and the seas are not susceptible to private
occupation because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of
anyone, and it is adapted for the use of all. Under these auspices, the skies
and seas are not subject to national appropriation because they cannot be
occupied definitively and are provided by nature. Jonathan C. Thomas,
Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 579, 59596 (2006). But cf.
Shackelford, supra note 39, at 124 (suggesting that changes in technology and
ability to occupy formerly impossible to occupy zones challenges the
fundamental premise of Grotius theory on the law of the sea).
80. See GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 35 (contrasting the contractual rights
to jurisdiction in piracy matters with claims of private property rights).
81. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at pmbl., art. 12 (Recognizing
the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use
of outer space for peaceful purposes, . . . All stations, installations, equipment
and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to
representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of
reciprocity.); see also Shackelford, supra note 39, at 142 (Space law is based
on the principle that outer space, including celestial bodies, should remain
freely accessible for exploration and use by all peoples. This is similar to the
original law of the sea.); Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for
International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession
Principles into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the
Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 32223 (2004) (The final
and most important principle, i.e., that nations cannot appropriate portions of
space, stems from the idea that outer space is res communis.).
82. See Shackelford, supra note 39, at 142; Thomas, supra note 79, at
60102 (For example, both sea and outer space are mediums of travel, require
vessels for human transport, are perilous, and virtually unlimited in scope.
Not only are there similar physical characteristics, but they also embody
intangible ideas of the pursuit of exploration, possibility, expansion,
technological evolution, colonization, scientific experimentation, fascination
with the unknown, and increased freedom of movement. Due to these
similarities, the seas are a good analogy for addressing issues which may arise
from the use of outer space.).
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exception proposed by Grotius, that a person may use a
common area he occupies for as long as the occupation lasts, as
shown by the fact that the ITU only grants temporary,
forfeitable licenses to use areas of GEO.83 While these licenses
do not confer a property right, they do purport to confer a right
to use an area of space; and, even though the ITU likely has no
authority to exclude others from operating in the same space,
the mere presence of the satellite would deter and likely
prevent others from attempting to occupy the same location.84
Thus, the Outer Space Treaty not only relies on Grotius theory
as an initial basis for preventing private ownership, but also
employs the exceptions Grotius identifies.
2. Economics of Law Theory
Harold Demsetzs approach to property differs from these
natural law approaches in that his theory is eminently
pragmatic, holding that property rights should exist if it would
be beneficial for society to have them exist.85 While Demsetzs
justification for his utilitarian theory differs from the
justifications of natural law theories, both answer the same
question: is it a good idea to confer property rights?86 The main
thrust of Demsetzs argument is that it is a good idea to create
83. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1113 (Once an orbital position and
frequencies have been registered, the registration remains in effect until the
operator-defined system life expectancy has expired, or until the ITU is
notified that the frequency and orbital position are no longer in use by the
registrant.).
84. Id. at 111213 (Though some obligation to accommodate remains
when conflicts between early and later registrants arise, early registration
affords a measure of legitimacy that supports the first registrants negotiating
position. Because the notification process affords preferential treatment to
early registrants, it is often characterized as first come, first served.).
85. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 548 (2005) (describing Demsetzs theory as a utilitarian
or economics of law approach to property); see also Demsetz, supra note 50, at
347 (Property rights are an instrument of society and derive their
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which
he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.).
86. See James Graham Lake, Note, Demsetz Underground: Busking
Regulation and the Formation of Property Rights, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1100,
1106 (2012) (Demsetz did not provide much detail about how property rights
change. The most he offered was that the emergence of new property rights
takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment
to new benefit-cost possibilities, suggesting that new rights are created
endogenously among the resource-users themselves, a form of spontaneous
private ordering.).
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property rights when property is used to create an
internalization of externalities.87 Externalities, for Demsetz,
mean the benefits and costs of an action, which are typically
not accounted for by an actor who does not have a stake in the
costs and benefits.88 The function of granting an individual
property rights is that it allows the individual to have a greater
stake in the benefits and costs associated with his actions,
allowing him to make more efficient choices.89 In common areas
with no property interest, actors will often ignore these
externalities since their effects are typically not worth the cost
of calculating the potential harm or benefit to the actor.90 By
analyzing historical examples such as hunter-gatherer tribes of
Native Americans, Demsetz concludes there is a close historical
relationship between increased knowledge of how to efficiently
exploit resources and the conferral of property rights.91 This
suggests a possible explanation to the current problem facing
GEO since the increase in knowledge of how to exploit the
resources is conflicting with the lack of a private right to do so.
It is important to note that while the underlying values of
the natural law theory and Demsetzs utilitarian theory are not
identical, they will often lead to the same conclusion.92 Thus,
the utilitarian argument for efficiency is not inherently
inconsistent with a theory of fairness expressed in the natural
law theories.
87. See Demsetz, supra note 50, at 348.
88. Id. (Externality is an ambiguous concept. For the purposes of this
paper, the concept includes external costs, external benefits, and pecuniary as
well as nonpecuniary externalities.).
89. Id.
90. Id. (What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is
that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of
the interacting persons is too high to make it worth-while, and this is what the
term shall mean here.).
91. Id. at 351.
92. Compare id. at 351 (discussing how before the advent of the fur trade,
Native Americans had no need to control herds of animals in pens or other
enclosures, and so allowed them to wander, taking what they needed), with id.
at 35253 (describing how the increase in the fur trade increased incentives to
enclose herds of animals, and invest in farms requiring the cultivation of the
land), and LOCKE, supra note 50, at 2528 (describing how the investment of
the land with labor, through cultivation can lead to a property right).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. LOCKES THEORY SUGGESTS INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ABLE
TO CONVERT GEO INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY
Analyzing the situation first from a Lockean perspective,
GEO should be open to private ownership when individuals
have invested their labor in the space.93 Companies that
currently have satellites in orbit have invested time and
resources sufficient to attain a property right in the orbital
zone.94 Looking to the theories of Lockes work, which argue
that an increase in value is a necessary condition for labor,
satellites in GEO clearly meet the standard.95 Since space is
essentially void,96 a satellites presence will increase the value
of the space by generating industry and allowing for
communications and other activities, which were not possible
because that space was empty to begin with.97 One argument
against this theory is that the space is at its highest value as
void, since the voided area itself allows for travel through that
point on future space missions.98 However, this argument
would overstate the need for a spacecraft to cross the very
narrow belt of satellites in GEO.99 It is also possible to argue
93. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 26.
94. See generally The Cost of Building and Launching a Satellite,
GLOBALCOM, http://www.globalcomsatphone.com/hughesnet
/satellite/costs.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (describing the extensive costs
that are involved in designing, launching, and maintaining a satellite).
95. See Thompson, supra note 61, at 55 (arguing that Lockes theory
requires improvement before conferring a property right).
96. See David Ferguson, Neil deGrasse Tyson Explains the Vacuum of
Space, RAWSTORY (Sept. 12, 2013, 13:02 ET), http://www.rawstory.com
/rs/2013/09/neil-degrasse-tyson-explains-the-vacuum-of-space/ (describing how
space is a vacuum and has little to no particles).
97. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 20 (explaining how GEO satellites
are often used for communications).
98. See Janey Tracey, Hunting Down Garbage that May Hinder Space
Colonization, OUTER PLACES (Sept. 11, 2014, 10:43 AM),
http://www.outerplaces.com/universe/technology/item/5859-garbage-orbiting-
earth-may-hinder-space-colonization (The space debris problem may . . . lead
to increased danger surrounding future space missions . . . .).
99. See Indias First Mars Satellite Mangalyaan Enters Orbit, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28268186
(describing how India sent a satellite to Mars). While GEO is not completely
filled with satellites yet, it is clearly possible to traverse large areas of the
solar system without running into a satellite in GEO, as proven by the recent
Indian satellite success.
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that the satellite would produce higher values elsewhere,
suggesting an opportunity cost and thus a net loss compared to
the current location.100 However, this argument relies on the
fluctuating value of the satellite and not the value of the GEO.
Since the party launching the satellite already owns it, the
question of its value has no bearing on whether they have
improved the GEO area for purposes of Lockes theory.101 Thus,
under this interpretation of Lockes labor requirement, the
space is sufficiently increased in value so that it can be
considered property.
The same conclusion results under different
interpretations of Lockes theory of property. The more general
interpretation of Lockes theory is that any time someone
interacts with something with the purpose of bringing about a
better result, then that interaction constitutes labor and
confers a property right in the object.102 The satellites
themselves currently occupy a physical location, which does not
change relative to Earths position.103 This position prevents
other satellites from entering a wide area around the existing
satellite, and prevents other satellites from transmitting on
frequencies, which are already in use.104 These qualities denote
at least a transitive interaction between the person and the
GEO area through the satellite, since it was the individuals
purpose to place the satellite in that location. Lockes example
of tilling the land suggests that transitive relationships
between a person and the object of his action are sufficient to
confer a property interest.105 Thus, tilling and planting do not
necessarily require the actor to physically touch the soil with
his body, but rather allow him to do so through the use of
100. Cf. Space is Running Out in Orbital Parking Lot Satellites Jockey for
Profitable Slots, BALT. SUN, Sept. 20, 1993, 1A (describing how a specific GEO
location is more profitable than others since it would allow companies to easily
communicate between the United States and Asia).
101. Cf. Thompson, supra note 61, at 57 (examining whether a system
which mechanically rakes a beach would improve the beachs value and not
examining the effect of the action on the rake).
102. See Sanders, supra note 53, at 376.
103. See Planetary Orbits, supra note 18.
104. Finch, supra note 19, at 789 (stating that satellites must remain at
least 18 kilometers apart and cannot operate on the same frequencies as the
current satellites in the area).
105. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 29 (describing how a man tilling a field
can obtain a property interest).
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tools.106 In the context of a satellite as well, the person who
sends the satellite into orbit has a connection with his property
and that of the orbital zone.107 This makes sense on the
metaphysical level. For Locke, the reason a persons labor
converts common areas into private zones is because each
person owns his body.108 Here, ownership over the body is
converted into ownership over a satellite, and that satellite is
used in an exertion of great labor to settle a voided location in
space.109 Since a person owns the fruits of his labor, a satellite
owner gains a property interest in the GEO occupied by his
satellite.110 Therefore under this reading of Lockes theory,
anyone who places a satellite in geostationary orbit should be
conferred a property right in that space.
The labor need not alter the orbit itself, since the orbit is
simply a scientific property of a location in space allowing the
satellite to remain in a fixed point relative to the earth.111 In
this way, the satellite is no different from a house built on
Earth since both are bound to a fixed point, and improve the
area generally.112 It could be argued that the house inherently
alters the ground beneath it by laying foundations and is
therefore distinct from a satellite that simply occupies a
position. However, pouring concrete in an Earth bound location
is the same kind of action taken by placing a satellite in a
location bound to Earth, just farther away. Placing a satellite
in orbit is similar to transporting materials from one area and
erecting them in another location which does confer a property
right under Lockes theory (just as a farmer might harvest
106. Id. (He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and
sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property,
which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.).
107. Finch, supra note 19.
108. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 25 ([Y]et every man has a property in
his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever,
then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property.).
109. See generally LOCKE, supra note 50, at 3637 (describing how excess
labor created the concept of money). See also Caren Chesler, The New Space
Race, PRIV. WEALTH, Sept.Oct. 2014, http://www.fa-mag.com/news/the-new-
space-race-19032.html?issue=233 (discussing the large cost of GEO satellites).
110. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 27.
111. Planetary Orbits, supra note 18.
112. Cf. id.
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trees and transport them to his plot to build a house, so the
scientist combines electronic components and shoots them off to
GEO to make a functioning satellite).113 Spaces lack of matter
makes little difference to the question of whether the actor
invested labor in a specific location.114
B. GROTIUSNATURAL LAW APPROACH TO PROPERTY LIKEWISE
LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT
SHOULD ALLOW FOR PRIVATIZATION
While there are many similarities between Lockes
approach to property and Grotius theory, minor differences in
their views on occupation require separate analyses. Grotius
theory, while more difficult to satisfy, also supports an
argument for privatizing GEO. Under Grotius theory, private
property rights should be assigned to persons occupying an
area if that area is not for the common use and is typically
capable of being occupied.115 In the case of GEO, a satellite
physically occupies the location.116 The satellite occupies the
location because it manifests the same qualities as other forms
of occupation, including the exclusion of others from use.117
Grotius provides a clear test for determining whether an
individual has met the burdens of occupation: if the sought
after object is movable, then it must be permanently seized, but
if the object is immovable, then the erection of boundaries or
the erection of a building will suffice for the purposes of
occupation.118 Geostationary orbits have more in common with
113. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at 2528 (discussing generally how labor
investments bring about property rights).
114. See id.
115. GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 27 (arguing that occupation is a necessary
condition for ownership and that occupation will not confer a property right if
the area is communal in nature).
116. The existence of a satellite as opposed to a person actively being in the
location likely would suffice for Grotius definition of occupation since he
describes a building as a form of occupation (And whoever shall have
constructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become the
owner of the ground upon which said building is . . . .). GROTIUS, supra note
51, at 30.
117. See id. at 2526 (discussing the erection of immovable objects like
buildings qualifying as occupation).
118. Id. (This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things
which resist seizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted or
perpetually maintained, but in the case of other things it is sufficient if after
physical possession is once taken the intention to possess is maintained.
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immovable things than with movable objects, because
geostationary orbits are immovable since they simply denote a
location in space relative to Earth.119 While the area of space
that allows for geostationary orbits is far from Earths surface,
that distance does not transmute the space into something
other than a location.120 While it is difficult to place a satellite
in GEO, the same could be said of building a home in many
locations on Earth, but this difficulty does not deprive the
location from being occupiable for Grotius.121 This means that
satellites in GEO satisfy the threshold inquiry of Grotius
theory, namely whether there is an occupation.
This threshold inquiry must be followed with another,
conferring a limitation on the length of the ownership interest:
whether the occupation disrupts the common usage of
something, which was inherently meant for common use.122
While most of space likely does fit Grotius definition of
something common for all persons, the specific area of GEO has
properties distinct from the rest of space such that its use will
necessarily prevent the use of the area by others.123 Grotius
determines that, all that which has been so constituted by
nature that although serving some one person it still suffices
for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in
perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first
created by nature.124 Grotius seems to draw this analysis
broadly construing the sea itself as a whole, and not looking to
specific locations within the sea to determine the exclusion of
others.125 However, when Grotius applies this theory to smaller
Possession of movables implies seizure, and possession of immovables either
the erection of buildings or some determination of boundaries, such as fencing
in.).
119. See Planetary Orbits, supra note 18 (defining geostationary orbits).
120. See id.
121. See GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 30 (describing how a house built on a
sandy shore does occupy the area).
122. Id. (If any part of these things is by nature susceptible of occupation,
it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so far as such
occupation does not affect its common use.).
123. Finch, supra note 19, at 789 (examining the special properties of GEO
and concluding that only 2000 satellites can use the area at one time).
124. GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 27.
125. Id. at 29 (describing a fishermans use of the sea, and concluding that
even though that persons use prevents others from working and benefitting
from that same spot, the sea as a whole is still free for all use).
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areas, like inlets, he states that the theory no longer applies.126
The key difference between these two bodies of water is their
size,127 allowing Grotius to conclude that one persons use of the
inlet likely could preclude anothers use of the same area.128
Crucially, inlets are part of the ocean, but are readily
identifiable locations that may be easily occupied and used to
the exclusion of others.129 While GEO is not on the border of
space and Earth like an inlet, the key components of the inlet
do exist. Space, considered generally, is vast like the sea.130
However, the area of GEO, like a cosmic inlet, is extremely
limited, allowing only 2000 satellites to occupy key locations.131
Each satellite then has an immediate and clear effect on the
others, preventing them from using the same space and
frequency.132 Just as one fisherman in a small inlet would
prevent others from using the same area, a satellite in GEO
would preclude others from taking certain actions, like
broadcasting on the same frequency.133 Thus while space
generally might fit within Grotius theory regarding communal
nature of certain areas, the exceptions he creates for his theory
apply well to GEO. Since GEO is subject to occupation and is
not an area of communal use, GEO may be converted to private
property upon occupation.134
This conclusion suggests that there is at least a foundation
in underlying moral principles for this allocation of property
126. Id. at 32 (Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies
also to fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless
there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet
of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so establish a private preserve.).
127. Inlet, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/inlet
(last visited Oct. 5, 2015) ([A]n indentation of a shoreline, usually long and
narrow; small bay or arm).
128. See GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 32 (providing an example of an
exclusion of others from an inlet).
129. See id. (describing how an individual might use an inlet to the
exclusion of others).
130. See, e.g, How Big Is Our Universe, NASA (July 15, 2004),
http://www.nasa.gov/audience/foreducators/5-8/features/F_How_Big_is
_Our_Universe.html (describing the enormity of the universe).
131. Finch, supra note 19, at 789 (stating only about 2000 satellites can
occupy GEO at one time).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 27 (explaining the limits of occupation
and when the communal exception would apply).
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rights.135 While privatization may be morally justified, looking
to the practical effects of a policy allowing for privatization will
help fill in the analysis.136 In order to determine whether the
morally justified acquisition of property makes sense from a
utilitarian perspective, this comment will turn to an analysis of
GEO under Demsetzs theory.
C. ALLOCATING PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN GEO IS A
GOOD IDEA UNDER DEMSETZS THEORY
Demsetz argues that property rights arise when the gains
of internalization [of externalities] become larger than the cost
of internalization.137 The current approach to geostationary
orbit allocation creates direct, indirect, and administrative
negative externalities, which obstruct valuable space in
geostationary orbit.138 The effects of the current common
scheme are felt directly though the presence of large amounts
of debris.139 Under the current system, satellite operators have
no long term incentives to keep the orbital area clear from
debris since competitors will be able to take over the slot once
the satellite no longer functions.140 Since the satellite operator
cannot sell rights to the location after the termination of the
satellites functions, they can ensure that their competition
cannot easily gain access to the same space by leaving the
satellite floating in space.141 As a result of this type of
135. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and
Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1397
98 (2010) (explaining how natural law provides a coherent moral foundation
for property law). But cf. JOHN STEWART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 100 (A. D. Lindsay ed., E. P. Dutton & Co.,
Inc. new Am. ed. 1951) (1861) (arguing that the theory of utilitarianism is an
ethical theory).
136. Cf. Claeys, supra note 135, at 139798 (describing how American
jurists use both natural law and economics of law approaches when deciding
property disputes).
137. Demsetz, supra note 50, at 350.
138. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1124 (Satellite developers forego costs
when they can design and operate spacecraft that take advantage of the
communal environment. Losses due to pollution are borne by society as a
whole, while the cost savings accrue solely to the developer. In this instance,
the costs to the community environment manifest themselves in the form of
orbiting debris.).
139. See HILDRETH & ARNOLD, supra note 13.
140. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 1113.
141. See id. at 1125 ([U]nlike low Earth orbit debris, which gradually
disappears as drag effects produced by the upper reaches of the atmosphere
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incentive, [t]he amount of space junk is increasing by about 5
percent per year; meaning that by the end of the century a
satellite in GEO will have a 40 percent chance of being struck
during its operation life-time.142 This poses problems for global
communications networks, which rely heavily on GEO for their
operations.143 Not only are these direct costs harmful, but the
costs associated with preventing this kind of damage are also
relevant.144 Satellites must now carry debris shields, debris
monitoring systems, and maneuvering capabilities.145
Moreover, the lack of an external cost to profit from the area
has increased demand such that the ITU has a large backlog of
applications for GEO orbital slots.146 The ITUs current method
of granting orbital registration on a first come first served basis
does not allow for an efficient allocation of resources since those
who would be willing to invest more in the space (in the hope of
obtaining a larger return for their investment) are effectively
precluded from doing so by the current registration system.147
Since the costs to the area are not internalized in the sale value
of the area, they are passed on to others wishing to use the
space.148 Under Demsetzs theory, if the costs associated with
privatizing geostationary orbit slots are less than the benefits
eliminate it, geosynchronous debris tends to remain a continual threat in the
area.).
142. Hitchens, supra note 15.
143. Evan I. Schwartz, The Looming Space Junk Crisis: Its Time to Take
Out the Trash, WIRED (May 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010
/05/ff_space_junk/all/ ([Space debris] proliferation threatens not only current
and future space missions but also global communicationsmobile phone
networks, satellite television, radio broadcasts, weather tracking, and military
surveillance, even the dashboard GPS devices that keep us from getting lost.).
144. Taylor, supra note 32, at 262.
145. Id. at 26263.
146. Roberts, supra note 1, at 111920 ([T]he first come, first served
approach to registration has not helped to mitigate the negative effects that
arise because of the commons nature of the orbital resource. The relatively low
costs of filing an individual application with the ITU for a particular orbital
position are grossly inadequate to deter developers from attempting to seize
the potentially significant financial benefits associated with a valid
registration. Consequently, developers have raced to file as many applications
as their resources permit as quickly as possible and thereby prevent others
from doing the same. This problem is exacerbated because developers are
aware that there are far more applications than positions capable of
accommodating them.).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1124 (Losses due to pollution are borne by society as a whole,
while the cost savings accrue solely to the developer.).
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gained from such privatization, then property interests should
be allocated.149
First, allowing privatization of geostationary orbit will
mitigate future space debris and potentially allow for a clean
up of current debris.150 Analyzing different methods for
reducing space debris, Nodir Aldinov, Peter Alexander, and
Brenda Cunningham concluded that the lack of costs associated
with launching a satellite (apart from the costs necessary to
build and place the satellite in orbit) allows for more satellites
than optimum.151 This is because corporations seeking to
maximize profits have no need to take account of the negative
externality its satellite launches impose on other firms.152
Aldinov, Alexander, and Cunningham conclude that by
instituting a tax on each launch, actors would be incentivized
to internalize externalities, which would in turn bring the
number of launches to the socially optimum level.153 They
further contend that the profits from the launch tax could be
used to invest in programs to seek out and actively clean up
space.154
The creation of a property interest in GEO locations will
not only accomplish the end results of a tax, but it also provides
an incentive to launch a satellite in the first place. By creating
a property interest in geostationary orbit, the market will
quickly establish a price for the zone.155 This price will act in
149. See Demsetz, supra note 50, at 350.
150. See Nodir Adilov et al., Earth Orbit Debris: An Economic Model 2021
(Working Paper, May 14, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264915 (describing how a tax on entering orbit
would both deter those users of space that did not have a clear intent to
remain for long periods of time, and would help to fund resources which could
be used to clean up space debris).
151. Id. at 14 (Profit maximizing behavior results in excess launching
since firms fail to internalize the impact of debris on industry profits and
consumer welfare. A launch will generate lower expected profits since it
increases the risk to existing satellites.).
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id. at 21.
154. Id.
155. Joel D. Scheraga, Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space, 6
CATO J. 889, 896 (1987) (The social optimum, of course, is unknown ex ante;
rather, it will tend to emerge once private property rights to orbital slots are
assigned and enforced. By assigning property rights, a market is established
in which the rights to the orbital slots may be bought and sold. Selfish
maximization of the profit from property rights will lead to a socially efficient
outcome.).
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the same way as a tax, forcing actors to consider not just the
cost of the satellite (which will inevitably be lost), but also a
potential return on the investment in the property right
itself.156 The creation of this additional cost and benefit will
eliminate negative externalities associated with too many
satellite launches.157 Additionally, allowing actors to resell
their orbital zone or reuse it as needed provides an added
incentive to actively clean up the area.158 Therefore, like the
imposition of a tax, creating a private interest in a GEO slots
will decrease the number of excess satellites launched into
GEO, and provide incentives to clean up the area in order to
maximize profits.
Unlike a tax however, property rights more efficiently
ensure a preservation of a clean space environment.159 Murray
N. Rothbards book, For a New Liberty, discusses a libertarian
approach to pollution and finds that the governments control
over pollution regulations is much less efficient than a private
property owner enforcing their rights through the court
system.160 In part, this inefficiency results from an apathetic
156. See id.
157. Id. (The negative externalities will be eliminated.). It might be
argued that a tax would be a simpler approach to the problem of orbital
debris, but determining the social optimum is difficult in any given situation
since many presumed benefits related to satellite launches cannot be
accounted for in most models. Id. (The social optimum, of course, is unknown
ex ante.).
158. Cf. Matthew J. Kleiman et al., Protecting the Space Environment,
SCITECH LAW., Summer 2012, at 20, 22 (describing how under the current
regime only about half of satellite operators remove the satellite from GEO
once it is non-functioning).
159. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 31718 (2d ed. 2006),
http://mises.org/sites/default/files/For%20a%20New%20Liberty
%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto_3.pdf (discussing how a lack of private
ownership will ultimately entail an apathetic enforcement against pollution).
160. Id. (Government officials cannot sell the rivers or sell stock in them.
Hence, they have no economic incentive to preserve the purity and value of the
rivers . . . . Anyone has been able to dump polluting garbage and wastes in the
waters. But consider what would happen if private firms were able to own the
rivers and the lakes. If a private firm owned Lake Erie, for example, then
anyone dumping garbage in the lake would be promptly sued in the courts for
their aggression against private property and would be forced by the courts to
pay damages and to cease and desist from any further aggression.). Rothbard
does state that the effectiveness of private property rights as a pollution
deterrent does rely on access to an engaged judiciary. Id. at 322 (The remedy
is simply for the courts to return to their function of defending person and
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enforcement of the laws, which do not benefit the enforcers.161
Rothbard additionally argues the governments assessment of
the potential harms of pollution often differ from those who
have a stake in the matter, and thus fail to take into account
the full magnitude of the situation, leading to inefficient tax
regimes.162 In a private system with redress to the courts,
property owners will zealously defend their property from
trespass, and will do so efficiently, because they are able to
take into account the relevant variables that threaten their
property, where the government cannot take such an
individualized approach.163 Thus, while the benefits derived
from a system of taxation and a private property system are
similar, the allocation of private property will ultimately lead
to a more efficient protection of GEO.
This, in turn, will effectively eliminate the need for indirect
costs associated with preventing harm to satellites in orbit.
Currently, satellites must contain equipment necessary to
track, and maneuver away from orbiting debris.164 With a
reduction in the number of satellites and an increased number
of satellites moved to graveyard orbits, and the potential for a
reduction in other forms of debris, the need for such
sophisticated technology will decrease.165 The market will
control this as well, since risk adverse actors will desire
avoidance systems so they can ensure a return on the resale of
the property after the satellites eventual failure.166
It is possible to argue that the distribution of property
rights will be inequitable and as such will be lead to many
parties being worse off than they were under the current
property rights against invasion, and therefore to enjoin anyone from injecting
pollutants into the air.).
161. Id. at 31718.
162. Id. at 320.
163. Id. at 32021 (discussing how courts in trespass cases will sometimes
not grant injunctions on the theory that the public at large benefits more from
allowing pollution than not allowing it, and the legislatures actions to support
this claim). See generally id. at 323 (arguing that this approach to the
enforcement of rights does not account for the true damages caused by the
trespass).
164. Taylor, supra note 32, at 262.
165. See id.
166. See Scheraga, supra note 155, at 896 (discussing how the market will
determine the most efficient price for the transfer of ownership).
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approach.167 First, the current systems allocation of orbital
rights on a first come first serve basis has the same problem of
inequality, excluding actors from developing nations without
advanced space programs.168 Moreover, the creation of the
property right gives the current holder an incentive to transfer
the property later once others private investors and smaller
countries, which were unable to initially access space, are
willing to pay compensation.169 Under the current system,
developing nations or startup companies will have no way of
bringing their product to market in a timely manner since the
barrier to entry is artificially low.170 In essence, the allocation
of property rights in GEO may not be the most equitable
solution initially, however the market will determine a price,
which any nation or actor may pay to access the area, and in
this way it is eminently equitable.171
Under Demsetzs theory, the comparative increase in
efficiency brought about by the creation of a property right
suggests that the property right should exist.172 After
examining the current problems facing GEO, and the benefits
of privatization, it seems clear that the costs of privatizing are
minimal,173 while the costs of not privatizing the area are
great.174 Since the benefits to privatization outweigh the costs,
the area should be privatized.
167. See id. (stating that the process of privatization will lead to an
efficient, but not always equitable outcome).
168. See Bogotá Declaration, supra note 40 (The solutions proposed by the
International Telecommunications Union . . . are at present impracticable and
unfair and would considerably increase the exploitation costs of this resource
especially for developing countries that do not have equal technological and
financial resources as compared to industrialized countries, who enjoy an
apparent monopoly in the exploitation and use of its geostationary
synchronous orbit.).
169. See Scheraga, supra note 155, at 896 (discussing how the private
property system will facilitate an efficient exchange of resources for the orbital
zones).
170. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 111920 (analyzing the ITUs current
administrative approach to the granting of registrations for GEO satellites).
171. See Scheraga, supra note 155, at 896.
172. Demsetz, supra note 50, at 350.
173. See Scheraga, supra note 155, at 896.
174. See Schwartz, supra note 143.
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III. CONCLUSION
The current approach to geostationary orbit outlined in the
Outer Space Treaty works against both natural law and
utilitarian theories of property. The current approach precludes
actors from attaining a private interest in an area they have
developed both economically and morally. The
mischaracterization of geostationary orbit as a non-scarce
resource has led to an increase in the amount of space debris
and danger for current and future space missions. After
analyzing the theoretical and economic justifications for the
initial acquisition of property rights, this note concludes that
allowing actors to attain a private property right in
geostationary orbit is both morally and economically justified.
